

**From Subjectivity to Method:
Countertransference and the Role of Dreams in Organizational Ethnography**

MARK DE ROND

Judge Business School
Cambridge University
mejd3@cam.ac.uk

Abstract

One of the more interesting trends in organizational ethnography is the increasing allowance made for self-reflection in published field accounts. This ‘me-search’ feature seeks to account for the researcher’s footprint and, in doing so, to attend to the issue of subjectivity. This article contributes to that trend by pinpointing a particular type of subjectivity, namely countertransference, and explores the potential of anxiety dreams to help in its identification. Using field notes from a recently completed ethnography of Cambridge University’s preparations for the Oxford and Cambridge Boat Race, it argues that dreams are a useful resource for reflexivity. The article concludes with practical suggestions for organization researchers keen to understand how they, their anxieties, and their dreams are implicated in the production and interpretation of field accounts.

Key words: subjectivity, ethnography, countertransference

**From Subjectivity to Method:
Countertransference and the Role of Dreams in Organizational Ethnography**

Buried in every research manuscript is a declaration, explicit or otherwise, of how the author relates to her subject. At the best of times, this relationship will have been reflected upon and described in sufficient detail for readers to appreciate the impression left by the researcher's footprint. Typecast as 'subjectivity', this footprint has traditionally been regarded as something to be avoided or if not avoided then identified and eradicated in the interest of purity. Many a doctoral training course is designed to help prevent researchers from contaminating their data by introducing a sophisticated arsenal designed for precisely that purpose. Slapdash scholarship and indiscriminate storytelling no longer suffice to warrant publication (cf. Gordon & Howell, 1959: 355, 379). Rorty's (2000) techies have it over the fuzzies. We have come a long way.

This article argues neither for, nor against, a particular method. Grounded in the belief that subjectivity affects all manner of research (even if to varying degrees) it suggests that subjectivity is, in fact, methodologically valuable. In doing so, it contributes to a trend in organization scholarship of exploring affinities between researcher and researched (Reed-Danahay, 2001: 407; Marcus, 1998: 17). As a case in point it takes on the most anthropocentric of organization science methods: ethnography, as it is more vulnerable than most to accusations of subjectivity. Within ethnography, it locates a particular type of subjectivity – countertransference – or what happens when our (often unconscious) experiences

interfere with data collection and interpretation. Countertransference is by no means the sole province of ethnography. But by taking on a method particularly prone to countertransference, this article seeks to sensitize organization scholars more broadly to the risk of countertransference in their own work, and the resources available to them for reflexivity.

This article is structured in five sections. The first takes its cue from a longstanding scholarly conversation around subjectivity in general, and countertransference in particular. This is followed by an exploration of anxiety dreams as one potential resource in locating the risk of countertransference. Nowhere do I suggest that dreams have special powers or even that they are the only or best means for doing so. Nor is this intended as a guide to the interpretation of dreams. Its aim is simpler: to explore the extent to which anxiety dreams are methodologically useful in helping us understand how, and where, researchers might be at risk of over-exploiting, over-identifying with, soft-pedaling or omitting data as a means of anxiety avoidance. This requires not the removal of, but a fuller accounting for, the ethnographer. A fourth, empirical section puts flesh on the skeleton by means of four dreams from a recent ethnographic project, two of which are discussed in some detail. A final section proposes some guidelines for organizational ethnographers keen to understand how their own anxieties, as manifest in dreams, may bear upon their data, and concludes with broader implications for organizational research.

COUNTERTRANSFERENCE DEFINED

Countertransference has its origins in psychoanalysis. Coined by Freud in 1910, it suggests that the patient's influence on the analyst's unconscious feelings can materially interfere with treatment. These emotional reactions are not determined by the patient's disorders or personality but by the psychoanalyst's own anxieties (Blake and Ramsey, 1951; Devereux, 1967: 41-42; Fliess, 1953). Today, the concept has currency beyond psychoanalysis, specifically in reference to the risk of research output being inadvertently influenced by the research process: countertransference prevents us from seeing, helps us to see, to bear what we see, and to comprehend what we see (Stein 2000: 371). If so, it would seem useful to understand the extent to which these reactions shape our field accounts, and to explore what, if anything, might be done to account for at least some of this effect.

The psychoanalyst and anthropologist George Devereux bears responsibility for its popularization and diffusion. He himself appropriated the term to describe the degree to which a behavioral scientist's feelings, fantasies, bodily sensations, personality, and physiological attributes manifest themselves in data gathering, recording and analysis:

The perception of a situation is radically influenced by the perceiver's personality. The experimental subject often subtracts from, or adds to, reality or else rearranges it in conformity with his personality makeup and with his – largely unconscious – needs and conflicts (Devereux, 1967: 43).

Devereux's influential study includes descriptions of 440 cases of

countertransference reactions in behavioral science experiments, at least forty of which relate to his own blind spots, anxieties, and inhibitions (1967: xv). As La Barre writes in his introduction to Devereux:

Where once the hairy-chested anthropologist could suppose that he entered the field wholly innocent of any ideas, motivations, theories or apperceptive culture of his own, we are now invited to discern the anthropologist at once as sapiens and culture-bearer and person, and the possibility that his simple 'science', if undisciplined by awareness of countertransference, may be a self-indulgent branch of lyric poetry, telling us how he projectively feels about the unknown ... few fieldworkers have had the combined intelligence, integrity and intrepidity to discern countertransference phenomena: how the observer of human data reacts as a person and as a human being to his own observations." (Devereux, 1967: viii-ix)

Ethnography provides particularly fertile ground for exploring countertransference given the experience of anxiety that can accompany it.¹ This anxiety is a corollary of having plunged lock-stock-and-barrel into alien waters, and may cause researchers to over-exploit, omit, soft-pedal or over-identify with data as a means of anxiety avoidance (Devereux, 1967). Self-disclosure has been touted as a solution but is predicated on being able to self-detect where one is at risk of countertransference in the first place. This article proposes a relatively novel

¹ A footnote in Van Maanen and Kolb (1983) provides a nice illustration of how anxiety can cause researchers to overpromise; in this case John Van Maanen ranking as one of his early *faux pas* his promise not to reveal the identity of the police department he was shadowing due to him being overly anxious and eager to please.

detection tool, namely anxiety dreams. After all, if we can demonstrate the utility of something as deeply private as dreams in warning of countertransference, we might become less inclined to relegate anything remotely subjective to the loony bin: great for fireside story-telling but unsolicited in scholarship. We can do better than that.

Simply put, the argument here is as follows. The experience of organizational ethnography can mobilize anxieties. These risk influencing the generation of, and attribution of meaning to, ethnographic field data through a process known as countertransference. They do so by, for example, causing researchers to over-identify, over-exploit, omit, or soft-pedal data as a means of anxiety avoidance. To the extent that dreams activate and recombine memories of waking experience, and are powerful conduits for the experience of emotion, they might be seen well-suited to identifying the risk of countertransference. In other words, they have become methodologically relevant.

THE SELF IN RELATION TO THE OTHER IN ETHNOGRAPHY

Ethnography is at its most magical when adjudicating between subjective experiences. Its pedigree derives from its interest in reflexivity: in a jumble of subjective worlds, which is the proper route to an account of 'otherness'? Is it to try and safeguard neutrality by abstracting human behavior into descriptions of actions, categories, and counts so as to 'let the observational data (and nothing but that data) speak'? Or is it to fully and systematically account for the one doing the watching and interpreting as methodologically apposite? After all, ethnography is rarely one-directional: it "rests on the peculiar practice of representing the social

reality of others through the analysis of one's own experience in the world of these others. Ethnography is therefore highly particular and hauntingly personal" (Van Maanen, 1995: ix).

Native points of view cannot be considered plums hanging from trees, needing only to be plucked by fieldworkers and passed on to consumers. Rather, social facts, including native points of view, are human fabrications, themselves subject to social inquiry as to their origins. Fieldwork constructs now are seen by many to emerge from a hermeneutic process; fieldwork is an interpretive act, not an observational or descriptive one (Agar, 1986). This process begins with the explicit examination of one's own preconceptions, biases, and motives, moving forward in a dialectical fashion toward understanding by way of a continuous dialogue between the interpreter and interpreted." (Van Maanen, 1995: 93)

Fieldworkers are clearly affected by, and react to, what it is they see and experience (Davies and Spencer, 2010; Boyle and Parry, 2007; Vickers, 2007; Yarlykapov, 2007; Coffey, 1999; Behar, 1996; Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Kondo, 1990; Rosaldo, 1993; Devereux, 1967). These reactions may be mobilized by, but are not therefore also intrinsic to, what is being observed.

To recognize, and capitalize on, the self in scholarship is much less controversial today than it was when, in the late-1960s, Valetta Malinowski decided to publish her husband's field diaries, and Devereux put pen to paper. The emergence of a confessional genre in ethnography almost certainly "stems from the

notorious sensitivity of many fieldworkers to aspersions cast on the scientific status of their undertakings”, the result being “an attempt to explicitly demystify fieldwork or participant-observation by showing how the technique is practiced in the field (Van Maanen, 1995: 73).

The significance of the self is evident too in attempts to rethink the role of the body more generally in social thought (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984). Recent examples of this scholarly genre are Wacquant (1995, 2004, 2005) and Stoller (1997) in that both explicitly fuse the sensible and intelligible. Wacquant’s ethnography of amateur boxing, for example, evolved out of his participation as an apprentice boxer in an impoverished South Chicago gym for three years. He tells how he, as a boxing acolyte, needed to learn to internalize the pugilistic habitus; his description and subsequent analysis relied heavily on first-hand bodily experience. Likewise, Stoller’s work on Songhay sorcery called for an embodied approach given the reliance placed by the Songhay on sensuous experience. He recalls being ‘poisoned and paralyzed’ by ‘a sorcerer in the town of Wanzerbé’, a poignant reminder of the ‘Songhay world of eternal war’ (1997: 36). Based on his experiences as an apprentice sorcerer, Stoller notes that “in many societies these lower senses [smell, touch, taste, hearing, sensation], all of which cry out for sensuous description, are central to the metaphoric organization of experience; they also trigger cultural memories ... to accept sensuousness is, like the Songhay spirit medium or the Sufi Saint, to lend one’s body to the world and accept its complexities, tastes, structures, and smells” (1997: xvi-xvii). Each of these two ethnographies required a bodily engagement with the field, and confidence in the ability of the senses to inform

scholarly work. The self (including the anxious self) had become methodologically significant. Thus, the trend is for field accounts to become increasingly personalized:

It is totally necessary and desirable to recognize that we are part of what we study, affected by the cultural context and shaped by our fieldwork experience. It is epistemologically productive to do so, and at best naïve to deny the self an active, and situated place in the field. (Coffey, 1999: 37)

Lofland and Lofland concur, even if their reasoning is different. The self matters, they suggest, insofar as “we make problematic in our research matters that are problematic in our lives”:

In fact, much of the best work in sociology and often social sciences – within the fieldwork tradition as well as within other research traditions – is probably grounded in the remote and/or current biographies of its creators (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 13; as cited in Coffey, 1999: 6).

Clearly, our humanity, or the fact that we are emotional beings able to empathize with others, is the very thing that makes scholarship both possible and meaningful. It helps us relate to our subjects and they, having recognized an empathetic ear, to us. Interestingly, this empathy can be mobilized through dreams, an insightful example being the dream journal kept by Robert Lowie:

The renowned American anthropologist Robert Lowie ... kept a personal dream journal for nearly fifty years (from 1908-1957), and he was preparing an essay about his dream experiences when he died. Shortly thereafter, his

wife published his essay ... Lowie was, in his own words, a "chronic and persistent dreamer" who also often heard voices or saw visions when he was lying with his eyes half-closed. He remarks that during his later years his dreams helped him greatly in understanding visionary experiences of the Native Americans with whom he worked (Tedlock, 2003: 110).

THE DREAMING SELF

Dreams fascinate. Why is it that an otherwise "healthy soul gives, in dreams, the strangest, the most incoherent, the most illogical manifestations, and afterwards, when awake performs its function again in the most normal way" (Rignano 1920: 313)? Are the ethnographer's dreams an occupational hazard or can they serve a methodological purpose? Are they complicit in the collection and interpretation of field data, and if so how, and with what consequence? Such questions would seem relevant given that the experience of anxiety can (and often does) accompany the practice of ethnography (e.g. Whiteman, 2009; Kisfalvi, 2006; Kleinman and Copp, 1994; Devereux, 1967)), given that anxiety has been shown to influence the collection and interpretation of field data (e.g. Devereux, 1967; Stein, 2000), and given ethnography's footprint on the organization sciences. Consider, for example, such seminal works as Mayo's Hawthorne experiments, Goffman's (1961) study of life inside a psychiatric institution, Mintzberg's (1973) study of managerial work and Van Maanen's (1975) of policing in Union City, Barley (1986)² comparative

² According to a 2006 *Academy of Management Journal* poll, 65 percent of articles considered to have impacted greatly on our field relied substantially on qualitative data. Not insignificantly, the most highly ranked paper was Barley's 1986 article.

analysis of two radiography departments and Feldman's (2000) work on routines as sources of change in a university, Gephart's (1993) textual analysis of a public inquiry following a fatal pipeline accident and Greenwood and Suddaby's (2006) study of institutional entrepreneurship in accountancy as well as Zilber's (2002) work with a rape crisis center in Israel.³ Each successful challenged conventional ideas about organizations.⁴ In each, the self (let alone the anxious self) merits little or no mention; this despite repeated calls to take the self as epistemologically significant (e.g. Boyle and Parry, 2007; Coffey, 1999; Ellis, 2007, 1995, 1991)⁵. We are, after all, the principal instrument in 'doing' fieldwork, and so why not appraise ourselves with much the same dedication as we would any research instrument?

The difficulty with dreams is, of course, that they are intensely private, non-replicable, and unverifiable. That would present a real problem were we to induce theory from dreams – but of course we are not. Thus we might be let off the hook in utilizing dreams merely as a signaling mechanism, warning the researcher in question to be extra vigilant, to collect further data, to conduct additional interviews, to reveal to field informants what she is feeling so as to pinpoint differences between their respective experiences, or to test varying interpretations of the data already at hand.

³ Some of these 'disruptive' studies came from Martha Feldman's recent presentation at the 2009 AOM PDW on Writing Ethnographic Tales.

⁴ Other examples include Anteby (2008), Ashcraft (1999), Bechky (2003), Carlile (2002), Evans, Kunda and Barley (2004), Hargadon and Bechky (2006), Locke (1996), Maitlis (2005), Metiu (2006), Michel (2007), Perlow (1999), Perlow, Gittel and Katz (2004), Prasad and Prasad (2000), Pratt (2000), Walsham (1993), Weeks (2004), and Whiteman and Cooper (2000).

⁵ See also Angrosino, 1989; Atkinson, 1992; Campbell, 2001; Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Davies, 1998; Ellis and Bochner, 1996; Harris and Huntington, 2001; Kisfalvi, 2006; Kleinman and Copp, 1993; Lofland and Lofland, 1995; Okely and Callaway, 1992; Vickers, 2007; Whiteman, 2009; Yarlykapov, 2007

Before proceeding, it would seem apposite to say something about the ontological status of dreams, specifically on how they relate to waking experience. However, to do so is not unproblematic. The true nature of dreams remains obscure and their interpretation controversial. It is well known that their pioneers, Freud and Jung, thought dreams of outstanding importance in understanding the interaction between the conscious and unconscious (Peters, 1998). “The interpretation of dreams is”, Freud wrote in 1953, “the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind”. It was a discovery he maintained until the end to contain “even according to my present-day judgment, the most valuable of all the discoveries it has been my good fortune to make” (Freud as cited in Price 1986: 3). Both Jung and Freud viewed dreams not as a confused bundle of pointless associations but as the meaningful product of psychic activity that is susceptible to systematic analysis (Jung, 2006:3), even as they could strongly disagree on their interpretation.

For the ethnographer embedded into an alien social setting, dreams can be unsettling: they often lack logic, can reflect questionable morality, be uncivilized, absurd or otherwise unsettling. To speak publicly about them is to risk inviting ridicule, and it may be little surprise that the ethnographer’s own dreams are rarely offered up for discussion, even in serious ethnographic writings (Levine, 1981: 277-8). This squeamishness may be due in part to the risk of the ethnographer being seen as self-indulgent or overly narcissistic, because doing so is fraught with personal or professional risk (Boyle and Parry, 2007), outright dangerous (Lee, 1995; Rose, 1990; Kleinman and Copp, 1993; Lederman, 1990), good material for

gossip (Stoller, 1997), prey to the accusation of armchair ethnography, or ‘me-search’ (Fine 1999), or simply because scholarship has not demanded it. As Lofland and Lofland (1995: 13) observe, “the norms of scholarship do not require that researchers bare their souls, only their procedures.” Yet even so, is critical self-reflection not very much a matter of procedure? After all, if the self is as strongly implicated in research as many have suggested⁶, it would seem only appropriate that we investigate ways in which this self shapes the way in which we generate and give meaning to our data. This, in turn, may require us to upgrade, rather than downplay, the status of the ethnographer. The ethnographer will not, and never should, become the key focus of fieldwork but, nevertheless, should be treated as the very instrument that makes observation and interpretation possible in the first place.

Fortunately, neuroscience appears to be on our side in specifying the relation of dreams to waking experience. Recent advances mean we are now able to map brain activity when dreaming. New methodologies have allowed scientists to experimentally manipulate dream content at the onset of sleep so as to show that dreams indeed do relate to memories of waking experience. Thus, a set of experiments with subjects playing Tetris or a downhill skiing simulator before sleep resulted in sleep onset reports of imagines of Tetris or downhill skiing in up to 89 percent of these subjects (Stickgold et al., 2001: 1052, 1056). And yet, more than a

⁶ For example, Atkinson et al. (2001), Bell and Newby (1977), Casagrande (1960), Chang (2007), Coffey (1999), Devereux (1967), Ellis (2004), Emerson (1983), Etherington (2004), Lofland and Lofland (1995), Filstead (1970), Habenstein (1970), Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), Kimball and Watson (1972), Kisfalvi (2006), LeCompte, Preissle and Tesch (1993), Reed-Danahay (1997), and Whitehead and Conaway (1986).

century after Freud's landmark publication, we seem no closer to a consensus on dream construction and interpretation, and its theorizing continues unabated (Stickgold et al., 2001). Differences persist between those who view dreams as containing hidden messages, as archetypal or as affirming universal structures of expression, as projections of the self that have been rejected or suppressed, as a kind of dense hieroglyphic writing in need of decipherment, or indeed as just a random collection of heartfelt but unrelated images the interpretation of which is a non-starter. Bower's (2001) summary of dream theorizing is helpful in illustrating this diversity, and points to such contrary perspectives as those of Hobson and colleagues at Harvard Medical School and Solms at Royal London School of Medicine. Whereas the former claim that unconscious wishes play little or no part in dreams, and that dream interpretation has no scientific status, the latter relies on studies of brain damaged patients and brain imaging studies to conclude that dreams appear as if under the direction of a highly motivated, wishful state of mind, and surmises Freud might have been onto something after all (Bower, 2001: 91).

By contrast, and more to this article's purpose, there seems to be agreement on dreams as reflecting the activation and recombination of memories of waking experience (where both these memories and associations to them may be altered in the process, but precisely how and why remains a mystery), and on dreams as often being emotionally highly charged (Bower, 2001; Stickgold et al., 2001: 1055). By far the most common of these emotions is anxiety (Peters, 1990)⁷ Dreams can cause us

⁷ Devereux, in a bold experiment, sought to document the relation between waking experience of anxiety, and dreams as mobilized by this experience. His subjects, who were asked to watch some film footage, consisted of a small group of anthropologists and a larger group of professional and

to weep, to laugh, to feel rage, to be paralyzed with fear, or even to experience profound love or sexual arousal. And it is these much less contentious observations: first, of dreams as related to memories of waking experience and, second, of dreams as powerful conduits of emotion, that would seem sufficient justification for exploring dreams and their place in ethnography. After all, if fieldwork mobilizes anxieties, and if the stuff of dreams is reflective of waking experience and a good conduit for emotions, then dreams might usefully warn of countertransference.⁸ In practical terms this means that our dream records may help locate, and increase our awareness to, the risk of misattribution, over-identification, over – or under-exploitation, or soft-pedaling. (In similar vein, Devereux accounted for countertransference due to gender, race, ideology, and character, which had caused researchers to misinterpret their own attributes for those of their subjects.) The objective in adding this level of reflexivity is to generate more robust narratives, where robustness is defined in terms of ‘what is really possible’ rather than ‘what should be’.

semiprofessional staff of a psychiatric institution. His film of choice graphically portrayed Australian circumcision and sub-incision rites. Subsequent interviews with his subjects revealed a variety of dreams on the night following the film. What struck him was the extent of uniformity of psychosomatic responses, particularly where they involved such defensive manoeuvres as denial, displacement, and denial of relevance or doubts or uncertainties (Devereux, 1967: 54).

⁸ Studies that come closest to relating dreams to ethnography are to be found in anthropological writing (Stewart, 1997). Various useful reviews of this literature exist (e.g. Kilborne, 1981, 1995; O’Neill, 1976; Tedlock 1994). The bulk of it, however, focuses on the interpretation and role of informants’ dreams, rather than those of the ethnographer. For example, Lohmann’s study of the Asabano of Papua New Guinea shows how dreams are seen to entail encounters with the supernatural, and thus the Asabano consider them important in transmitting religious ideas (Lohmann, 2000). Likewise, Eggan illustrates how the Hopi Indians believe dreams to be of enormous consequence. According to their beliefs, a bad dream must be told immediately upon waking, after which the dreamer must go outside and spit four times so as to negate any negative effects (Eggan, 1949: 179). I do not suggest that dreams have any such powers.

Tedlock's (2003) description of the turn in some anthropological circles towards recording one's own dreams strongly endorses this program. It reinforces the belief that dreams reveal unconscious reactions to the people and culture one is trying to understand and describe. Her call for reflexivity with regard to one's own dreams is persuasive, drawing as it does on a wide range of examples, including her own and Malinowski's:

Today . . . I had a strange dream; homo-sex., with my own double as a partner. Strangely auto-erotic feelings; the impression that I'd like to have a mouth just like mine to kiss, a neck that curves just like mine, a forehead just like mine (seen from the side)" (Malinowski 1967:12).

Which Devereux (1978:224) understood to mean:

Typically, mirror or double images in dreams represent an attempt to restore, retrieve, or bolster a threatened sense of self through the mechanisms psychologists have labeled "projection" and "identification".⁹

If there is any merit in the proposition that anxiety dreams warn of countertransference, the implications are considerable. It would recommend that researchers record and reflect on their dreams, and bring these into play when interpreting field notes. As put to George Devereux by Géza Róheim, a pioneer in psychoanalytic anthropological research, it is imperative that the anthropologist

⁹ This example is cited in Tedlock (2003), p. 109

analyzes his countertransference reactions each day so as to separate those attributes that reflect his own inner conflicts from those characteristic of the subject of observation (Devereux, 1967: 47).

In what follows, I recount four anxiety dreams as relevant to my own fieldwork, two of which are analyzed in detail. Each illustrates one of four types of countertransference: over-identification, omission, soft-pedaling, and non-exploitation. They serve as illustrative devices and were selected purely for that reason. They occurred during a period of fieldwork with the Cambridge University Boat Club squad as they trained and prepared to select a crew to race their Oxford rivals in the 2007 University Boat Race,¹⁰ and were recorded immediately upon waking (something that became a regular practice during the research period). The

¹⁰ Founded in 1828, the Cambridge University Boat Club (CUBC) exists for one reason alone: to defeat its rival Oxford in the annual Boat Race. The race originated in a challenge between two friends – Charles Wordsworth of Christ Church, Oxford (nephew to the poet William Wordsworth), and Charles Merrivale of St John’s College, Cambridge – and was first rowed in 1829. Though the race has since moved from Henley-on Thames to London, it is rowed in late March or early April when the weather is at its most unpredictable. The four-and-a-quarter mile racecourse – almost four times the standard international length of 2,000 meters – usually takes around 18 minutes to complete and features, particularly in recent years, a selection of World and Olympic champions. The Boat Race grew rapidly in popularity. In recent years, a quarter of a million people lined the muddy riverbanks supported, in spirit if not in person, by an estimated 120 million tuned in via television or radio. Thus it became an event for public consumption even as, strictly speaking, it remains a private match between the students of two of the world’s oldest universities. Its popularity may be partly explained by the sharp contrasts it evokes: it is at once passionately amateur and yet holds to professional standards, exhibiting mutual respect yet intense rivalry too, something that is terribly elite and yet of keen interest to every stratum of society, where it’s all about taking part but where the pain of losing is intolerable. The race is rowed with the incoming tide from Putney to Mortlake (both London districts) in slim racing boats manned by eight oarsmen and one coxswain. The rowers are all men, though the coxswain can be a female (as was the case in 2007 for Cambridge), and all are full-time students. Given that students are accepted based on academic merit alone (applicants often remaining silent about their sporting ambitions), these oarsmen tend to be better educated than, and often intellectually superior to, their coaches. Moreover, given that the stamina required to race all-out for around 18 minutes is acquired only gradually, all of those trying for a place in either the Cambridge or Oxford crew will have been rowing for several years, often competitively. Thus, the 2007 Cambridge crew included one Olympic gold medallist, two reigning World Champions, two World bronze medallists, and one who went on to win Olympic gold in Beijing, meaning that they will often also have outperformed their coaches (many who will have been competitive oarsmen in their own time) on the water.

overall data set is substantial. It entails a 199-day full-time ethnography, starting with CUBC's first day of training on 19 September 2006 and ending with the actual race on 7 April 2007, comprising over 1,300 hours of in situ observation. These field notes were augmented with various data sources as ongoing personal correspondence between the ethnographer and crew, television footage of the 2007 Boat Race, close-up video footage of the 2007 Boat Race from the umpire's launch, video footage taken from inside the boat during the Boat Race, sound recordings of the coxswain's calls during The Boat Race (for both Oxford and Cambridge), over 350 email messages between squad and coaches, and some 1500 pages of historical documentation on the University Boat Race. These materials also include descriptions of my own dreams as encountered throughout the research and writing period, and recorded systematically immediately upon waking. These dreams were unusually disquieting and vivid. They were, as I hope to show, also methodologically significant.

Insert Table 1 here

Table 1 provides a brief description of the four anxiety dreams and the specific countertransference each alludes to. Given this article's genesis in Devereux's work, an illustrative case drawn from his own study is included, as well as a passage from my field notes as pertinent to these four dreams.

As Devereux suggested, the anxiety mobilized in ethnography has its origins in the personal history of the fieldworker. Thus, it would seem useful to supply some bare essentials on the one doing the research. I grew up in a religiously conservative family, as the eldest child of missionaries, on an island in Latin America. Even today, I vividly recall doing the rounds, each Friday evening, at three local hospitals. Equipped with a Spanish guitar, decorated with the three Angels of the Book of Revelation, our family would sing to, and pray for, the willing (and those too weak to protest). As recent converts, my parents felt particularly strongly about spiritual living – children included – meaning a staple of fasts and healthy diets (usually involving home-grown varieties fashionable within our community at the time). Financial hardships meant that my father made all our own furniture; that I had one pair of special shoes for church; and that, for lack of friends, my discovery of sexuality involved few bodies other than my own. Our eventual return to Europe provided no respite from insularity, with my mother as my guardian, occasional seamstress, and barber until my late teens, and me puttering through high school as a spotted, insecure and intellectually average teenager. This personal history may hold no special interest, nor should it, except of course when it begins to intrude into one's research.

THE DARK NIGHT OF THE ETHNOGRAPHER'S SOUL

To embed oneself in alien environs so as to better understand them is often to invite a more-active-than-usual dream world. The more foreign the context, the more likely that it will mobilize anxieties that, in turn, may be expressed in dreams. These

anxieties may reflect struggles with issues of identity, even at the most general level (e.g. Boyle and Parry, 2007; Coffey, 1999; Devereux, 1967; Vickers, 2007; Whiteman, 2009; Yarlykapov, 2007). This is hardly surprising if, as Lofland and Lofland suggest, we indeed tend to problematize (even if not deliberately) in research matters that are problematic in our personal lives (1995: 13).

A review of my dreams as recorded during the fieldwork points to a set of recurring anxieties: of identity and identification, sexuality, and survival, which subsequently led me to over-identify with, soft-pedal, fail to exploit or omit altogether. The four dreams selected as illustrative devices were experienced as disturbing, and caused me to worry about the risk of countertransference. By this time I had not yet discovered Devereux's work (and lacked the requisite vocabulary), yet was unable to fend off the realization that my dreams were somehow related to my experience of doing fieldwork. I asked two practicing psychoanalysts to analyze these four dreams. One was a Freudian, the other a Jungian, dream specialist; one female, one male.¹¹ Each had responded to an invitation sent by me via email to a small group of UK-based accredited practitioners, educated to PhD level in their fields, and experienced in the analysis of dreams. They volunteered their services for this project and worked independently (not knowing who, if anyone, else had been tasked with the same). Of these four dreams, two are discussed in more detail below, purely for illustrative purposes.

¹¹ Dr 'White' (PhD in Psychoanalysis) practices in London, and is a member of the College of Psychoanalysts, UK. She is a Freudian psychoanalyst. Dr 'Black' also practices in London, and is accredited with the United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy, and the British Psychoanalytic Council, and as a Supervisor with the Institute of Group Analysis. He is also a member of the International Association of Analytical Psychology, and is a Jungian psychoanalyst. I am enormously appreciative of both their time and voluntary efforts.

Their descriptions are followed by attempts at identifying countertransference, using relevant examples from the fieldwork.

Dream 1

"I seem to be in a playhouse but it's not one I recognize. It's a theatre all right, even if it has none of the usual tell-tale signs: no velvety chairs (no chairs at all as far as I can make out), no heavy curtains, and no chandeliers, and the stage looks fatigued, its floorboards stained with the residue of once popular but long since forgotten pantomimes. On the stage, and around me, are children, two dozen in all, but too short for their age and too tetragonal too, like characters out of a mean Japanese comic. They smile at me incessantly without a care in the world save to please me, all but their faces obscured by banded fluorescent costumes, so that with the lights dimmed all one sees are blue, green, yellow and orange lines dancing around in black space ... I appear to have been cast as a lion but have difficulty putting on a credible performance and can't seem to make up my mind whether to stand on my hind legs or make do on hands and knees, and I don't now recollect how the matter was decided in the end, but I do recall a faint hum as if from a distant world, annoying and yet strangely familiar. I have no idea why I'm here, or why I was cast as a lion, or who these little people are and what my relationship is to them ... "

Dream 2

"I find myself in a classroom not quite like my teaching rooms in Cambridge but a little like them, and in it are my work colleagues, managing to pull off what must be the

worst presentation ever. The crowd is getting restless, as I am, about the total lack of empathy on the part of my peers, and I decide to make a stand and march out angrily into a dark hallway leading to a holiday flat somewhere in Spain; and as I come walking in, my wife comes walking out of the apartment pushing a pram with a newborn inside it. Must be mine, I think, but I have no recollection of making or anticipating it ... The apartment is cloaked in twilight, the air not yet advanced to complete darkness, but it soon will be – and it all feels rather ominous. I switch on the lights in one room, but while this solves one problem it creates another, as the other rooms in the apartment now look even more inhospitable than they already did. I'm conscious of something dark moving behind me – not a person but the shadow of one. I freeze. The apartment, however, is eerily quiet. My heart, beating rapidly, has sought solace at the back of my throat. There's no one in this room but me. The adrenaline surges through my system, veins throbbing noisily in my head ... “

DISCUSSION

Devereux noted that distortion of perception on the part of the ethnographer was especially likely where fieldwork generated anxiety:

Studies of projective tests, of perception as a function of personality, of learning in a state of anxiety, as well as the scrutiny of transference and countertransference phenomena suggest that distortion is especially marked where the observed material mobilizes anxiety. The scientist who studies this kind of material usually seeks to protect himself against anxiety by the omission, soft-pedaling, non-exploitation, misunderstanding, ambiguous

description, over-exploitation or rearrangement of certain parts of his material (Devereux, 1967: 44).

Given the unusual intensity and abundance of anxiety dreams during my fieldwork, their records would seem useful repositories of material able to indicate where the field notes, and their interpretation, may be at risk of countertransference. The experience of anxiety is, of course, not confined to dreams, and dream analysis is almost certainly not the only, or even principal, means of identifying countertransference risk. That said, it is a readily available resource for ethnographers and adds another layer of reflexivity and self-awareness. This, in turn, encourages the fieldworker to be extra vigilant, and revisit data – or gather additional data, e.g. by sharing her dissonance with informants to test for competing experiences – before finalizing an interpretation of ‘otherness’. In fact, what would seem to make dreams fertile ground for those keen to understand where they are at risk of countertransference, is the available evidence for dreams as not just reflecting lived experience but in magnifying the intensity of emotional experience. For example, in the first dream, the fact that *“it’s a theatre all right, even if it has none of the usual tell-tale signs”* seems to suggest a co-existence of the familiar and unfamiliar. The place is theatre-like, even if bits of it are not. One interpretation might suggest that my familiarity with the broader canvas (or the recognition of this being a theatre) reflects at least a basic understanding of the world of rowing as an experienced oarsman. My own experience is based at ‘club’ (or town) level, meaning that plenty of mystery remains in terms of selection, competition at the level of

internationally competitive oarsmen, and the inner workings of a 180-year old institution. With regards to the possibility of countertransference, the dream would seem to warn against the risk of omission – of taking the familiar for granted, firstly, in failing to record some things because they are so much part and parcel of rowing training and, secondly, in assuming that things in Cambridge mean what they mean at the club level. For instance, given the standard at which Cambridge operates, the performance margins are much smaller and yet far more important than at a club level. In Cambridge everything counts; every land training exercise and every water outing provides information to coaches and informs selection. At a club level it is usually only the formal tests (usually 2,000 or 5,000 meter sprints on the rowing machine) that matter. By contrast, the exotic risks being emphasized over the ordinary, and hence risks the ethnographer losing a sense of perspective.

Unfamiliarity, on the other hand, may help the ethnographer better relate to any alienation experienced by those equally new to the environment. Of the 30-plus oarsmen who start each year with Cambridge, at least half will typically be newcomers. Thus it is perhaps no surprise that my early field notes contain very detailed descriptions of novices making an effort to integrate, for instance by means of relating anecdotes or jokes. That I am ‘on stage’ seems to suggest some self-consciousness on my part, as if I’m being watched. Can I live up to expectations and put on a credible performance? Are the novices as awkward as I am in finding their way?

There exists an interesting parallel between this dream and one of Devereux’s case descriptions, where my strong affiliation to novices might be

explained in terms of my own anxiety as a novice ethnographer and newcomer to CUBC:

Case 32: A graduate student, on his first field trip, learned that, because of a change in the power structure of the department resulting from the death of his professor, he would not be appointed instructor on his return from the field. This caused him to investigate with exceptional care the problem of orphans and other 'deserted' persons in the tribe he was studying (Devereux, 1967: 45).

Also, the choice of role of lion is an interesting one, and may point to some anxiety around the researcher's identity. While there is no animosity between the lion and Japanese characters, lions remain predators. One explanation might hint at an implicit recognition that ethnography may ultimately lead to betrayal; for our field accounts will rarely match the recollections and opinions of those involved very precisely (cf. Van Maanen & Kolb, 1983). It is a well-documented observation that most people tend to overestimate their uniqueness and importance (e.g. Gilbert, 2006), and may entertain quite different views on what happened and why. The risk here for the ethnographer is that of soft-pedaling – of trying to please through self-censorship, for example by glamorizing the lives of those involved.

The second dream appears to strongly relate to my persistent fear – and what at the time seemed a very real possibility – of being asked to leave the Club (which would have seriously compromised my research). It occurred during a particular poignant time. Some of the more senior members of the Club (most of

whom rowed for Cambridge in years past) had become concerned about my presence in the squad. They worried that, without a veto over my output, my writing might put the organization at risk. And so a particularly unpleasant battle ensued over editorial control, forcing the University to intervene on my behalf, and nearly causing me to be evicted. Thus, the *“I’m conscious of something dark moving behind me – not a person but the shadow of one”* seems a pertinent reflection of my emotional state of being at the time.

But the dream may also reflect a more general anxiety around the question of survival in the squad. As explained, the Cambridge University Boat Club operates to very simple rules. Their focus is constitutionally singular: to beat Oxford in The Boat Race, and anything that stands in the way of them achieving this objective is swiftly dispatched. Thus, each oarsman knows full well that selection decisions are ongoing, and that any one can be called into the coaches’ office at any time, on any day, and be culled from the squad. Likewise (and not necessarily justifiably) I was acutely aware that, should I be seen to interfere with training or selection, I might as easily be shown the door. Thus, on the one hand, I became more empathetic to experiences of anxiety of many Cambridge oarsmen as they battle selection, allowing me to capture their experience far more accurately. On the other, I may have become overly sensitive to their anxieties in allowing them to mirror my own. Dreams such as this warn against such countertransference, and forced me to verify that oarsmen are in fact experiencing something similar to what I was feeling. Indeed, subsequent conversations with squad members suggest that anxiety is experienced very differently between those new to the squad, those not new but borderline

candidates for the Blue Boat (or top crew), and internationally decorated oarsmen, many of whom appear certain of a place in the Blue Boat even as they might exhibit anxiety about a particular seat (e.g. the stern-most seats are generally viewed as the most prestigious). These observations suggest a risk of over-identification with novices – resulting in me misunderstanding anxiety experiences within the squad – moderated only by subsequent discussions with more senior oarsmen, prompted by my own anxieties, manifested in my dreams.

Finally, one wonders whether the classroom context that marks the beginning of the dream might suggest recognition of artificiality: “... *in it are my work colleagues, managing to pull off what must be the worst presentation ever. The crowd is getting restless, as I am, about the total lack of empathy on the part of my peers ...*” The functionality of the presentation, and its lack of empathy, might imply a growing frustration at the denial of real feelings – theirs as well as mine – generating a sense of restlessness and the hunkering for some more humane context. This would ordinarily be provided ‘at home’, with my wife and children, except that, as the “... *there’s no one in the room but me ...*” suggests, the ethnography is taking its toll and a split is developing between the ethnographer and his roles as husband and father. Like the squad who sacrifice College life (or their ‘home from home’) to train with CUBC, I seem to have little option but to watch my family life disintegrate in the shadow of my professional commitments.

IN CONCLUSION

This article entertained a simple proposition, the implications of which are not straightforward. If anxiety dreams can point to the risk of countertransference, they would seem to be methodologically relevant in the construction of organizational ethnographies. Anxieties, such as those around issues of identity and identification, of survival and failure, may introduce systematic 'distortions' in the collection and interpretation of field data, for example through reticence or disclosure (Lyons and Lyons (2004: 250). If so, they must be tackled with much the same attention as other sources of bias. For example, had it not been for an effort to take my dreams seriously, I might have been at risk of remaining unaware of over-identifying with the squad, of being at risk of overemphasizing the particular at the expense of the general, and of unfairly generalizing the levels of anxiety experienced by novices. The self, in each case, was presumptuous, and its presumption restrictive.

The self, as manifest in dreams, can also be generative in preventing premature closure and in forcing the ethnographer to ask questions he may not otherwise have asked. As Stein suggests:

Just as the observer seeks to control and diminish the facet of countertransference that distorts, the observer or analyst seeks also to give freer reign to the facet of countertransference that reveals (Boyer 1993, 1999) ... Greater access to one's unconscious, together with increased capacity to hold onto anxiety and examine the unconscious contents it signals ... would seem to be key ways of distinguishing the countertransference that *reveals* from the countertransference that *conceals* (2000: 351).

The difficulty in allowing for countertransference as distorting of data collection and analysis is that it complicates already difficult matters such as those of perception, inference, interpretation and generalization (Stein, 2000: 367). And yet the case for taking countertransference seriously is compelling:

When one learns via countertransference, one is including, incorporating, and examining something within oneself, temporarily identifying with what one takes in and contains. When one does not learn via countertransference, one is excluding, expelling, ridding something from oneself. The former leads to greater integration, the latter, to greater fragmentation (Stein, 2000: 347).

A further complication relates to dream interpretation. If, as I have argued, they are methodologically relevant, how, and by whom, are they to be interpreted? Ideally interpretation would be left to psychoanalysts properly trained in dream analysis. However, not only is this impracticable, given that the analysis of even a single dream requires multiple sessions for close analytic work with the dreamer in the first instance, but the interpretation may vary depending on the ideological and intellectual orientation of the analyst. Dreams may even be open to various interpretations with no possibility for verification. If we are not best suited to interpret our own dreams, and given that a professional psychoanalyst with the relevant training in dream analysis is not always an option, how else might we do this?

One approach is that offered in this article, namely an analysis along broad lines. This suggestion is based on the assumption that – for the specific purpose of identifying the possibility of countertransference – it suffices to identify anxieties as reflected in dreams. To tackle the more difficult problem of locating their causes is probably not strictly necessary. After all, the aim is to come clean methodologically, not therapeutically. Specifically, this entails the ethnographer to maintain a written record of dreams, recorded immediately upon waking and with the same concern for detail as other observations, as a separate document from the field journal. These dream data are treated in much the same way as are field data, in that the researcher examines them for common themes. These then become the basis for exploring underlying anxieties. The field journal is subsequently re-examined against these anxieties to identify where it is at risk of countertransference reactions that may have caused the fieldworker to, e.g. misrepresent, over-identify, over-exploit, omit, or soft-pedal data. Knowing this, she can try to mitigate this risk by, for example, conducting further interviews or gathering additional observational data, or even by revealing to field informants what she is feeling, so as to highlight the difference between their respective experiences. The Australian anthropologist Michael Jackson, for example, used to share his dreams with the Kuranko of northeast Sierra Leone, where he was active in the 1970s. Even where their interpretation differed substantially from his own, they helped put his anxieties to rest and to reassure him that the Kuranko took him seriously. In the process he also learned a great deal about them (Tedlock, 2003). This idea of fieldworker sharing dissonance with informant parallels a recent development in psychoanalysis where

countertransference is becoming an integral part of the diagnostic process itself, using clinically sophisticated and psychometrically sound techniques (Betan et al, 2005). One such technique is a Therapist Response Questionnaire¹² designed to help clinicians, regardless of disciplinary orientation, make therapeutic use of their own reactions to a patient. Instruments like these are based on the empirical observation that countertransference reactions to specific disorders are shared across practitioners, regardless of their different theoretical interests (Betan et al, 2005). So, for example, feelings of anger, resentment and dread, feeling devalued and criticized, distracted and avoidant are all experiences typical of clinicians working with narcissistic personality disorder patients (Betan et al, 2005). This observation of universal experience is consistent with that of Devereux (1967, e.g. p. 54), who used anthropologists, and students and staff at a psychiatric hospital. Again, subjectivity does not taint treatment but helps make it possible in the first place.

Alternatively, one could conceive of a system of peer supervision that, on a quid-pro-quo basis, allowing ethnographers to read and react to each other's field observations and experiences. Peer supervision might have highlighted my anxieties around issues of identity and identification, sexuality, and survival, and in doing so expand, rather than restrict, the scope of my investigations.

Even assuming the approach outlined above is workable it raises questions that, at least for the moment, remain unanswered. For example, might it be that a decision to systematically record our dreams affects either dream activity or our

¹² This particular questionnaire is available for inspection online at:
<http://www.psychsystems.net/Manuals/Countertransference/Westen%20countertransference%20questionnaire.pdf>

recollection of them? If baring oneself, or one's anxieties or dreams, is indeed a socially and professionally risky venture, might we choose to write under pseudonyms instead? If so, what implications would this have for the evaluation of scholarly output? At a more general level, how much of the ethnographer's self can, and must be, introduced into the picture? How much is too much? How far is too far? How are we to distinguish between 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?'

Finally, this article calls for a renewed interest in the relation between researcher and researched. The ethnographic experience strongly suggests that researchers are implicated in what they see, describe, and interpret, and our task here has principally been one of accounting for our own subjectivity by means of reflexivity triggered by anxiety dreams. Dreams are one means of identifying the risk of countertransference; other indicators include excessive sweating, persistent dryness of mouth, shortness of breath, and feelings of shame or angst (all of which are worthwhile recording as a matter of record for the ethnographer). Alternatively, countertransference risk might be smoked out by means of 'evocative autoethnography', 'emotional sociology' or 'introspective narrative' (cf. Ellis and Bochner, 1996; Okely, 1996; Reed-Danahay, 2001), or the experimental ethnographic writing advocated by Marcus and Kushman (1982). Poised somewhere between a reflection on understanding and understanding itself, the aim there is to clarify the epistemological issues implicated in specific cultural analyses by forcing fieldworkers to reflect on the process of creating knowledge about 'the other'. Even if the anxiety dream is then perhaps but one instrument, it is

nevertheless a useful, cheap and readily available resource, and so why not include it in our portfolio of reflexivity tools. Besides, there seems little or no harm in paying heed to dreams in that, once an area of risk has been identified, the ethnographer need do no more than mitigate this risk by gathering additional data or by sharing one's own dissonance with field informants. Ethnography is, after all, not so much about producing *objective* as it is about generating *robust* narratives; or making available, through reflexivity and full disclosure, the very eyes through which we see the world (even if the latter might philosophically be inadmissible).

Leaving ethnography aside, to what extent is reflexivity demanded of other types of organizational research? For example, how does how we feel towards an interviewee shape the interview and subsequent analysis of the transcription? Do the themes we choose to pursue in our work not reflect our own curiosity about why the world is what it is and why it isn't otherwise? Does our dislike, or awe, of an organization influence what we choose to record and report, and how? If so, what set of measures might we put in place to raise our awareness of the risk of countertransference? Clearly, it is imperative that our subjectivity not be ignored or tossed aside as an impediment but seen instead as the principal instrument in generating robust narratives in the first place. As Devereux (1967: xx) mused, as organization scholars we need not be saved from ourselves. It suffices to be oneself.

REFERENCES

- Agar, M. 1986 *Speaking of Ethnography*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
- Angrosino, M.V. 1989 *Documents of Interaction: Biography, Autobiography and Life History in Social Science Perspectives*, Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press
- Anteby, M. 2008 *Moral Gray Zones: Side Productions, Identity, and Regulation in an Aeronautic Plant*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Ashcraft, K.L. 1999 Managing maternity leave: a qualitative analysis of temporary executive succession, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **44** (2), p240-280
- Atkinson, P.A., Coffey, A.J., Delamont, S., Lofland, J. and Lofland, L.H. 2001 *Handbook of Ethnography*. London: Sage
- Atkinson, P.A. 1992 *Understanding Ethnographic Texts*, London: Sage
- Barley, S.R. 1986 Technology as an occasion for structuring: evidence from observations of CT scanners and the social order of radiology departments, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **31** (1), p78-108
- Bechky, B.A. 2003 Sharing meaning across occupational communities: the transformation of understanding on a production floor, *Org. Sci.*, **14** (3), p312-330
- Behar, R. 1996. *Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press
- Bell, B. and Newby, H.W. 1977 *Doing Sociological Research*, London: Allen and Unwin
- Betan, E., Heim, A.K., Conklin, C.Z. and Westen, D. 2005 Countertransference phenomena and personality pathology in clinical practice: an empirical investigation, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, **162**: 890-898
- Blake, R.R. and Ramsey, G.V. 1951. *Perception: An Approach to Personality*. New York

- Bourdieu, P. 1984 *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Bower, B. 2001. Brains in dreamland. *Science News*, 160(6): 90-92
- Boyle, M and Parry, K. 2007 Telling the whole story: the case for organizational autoethnography, *Culture and Organization*, **13** (3), 2007, Pages 185–190
- Campbell, R. 2001 *Emotionally Involved: The Impact of Researching Rape*, Routledge, New York, NY.
- Carlile, P. R. 2002 A pragmatic view of knowledge and boundaries: boundary objects in new product development, *Organ. Sci.*, **13** (4), p442-455,
- Casagrande, J.B. 1960 *In the Company of Man*. New York: Harper and Row
- Chang, H. 2007 *Autoethnography as method*. Left Coast Press, Inc.
- Clifford, J. and Marcus, G.E. 1986. *Writing Culture: The Politics and Poetry of Ethnography*. University of California Press.
- Coffey, A. 1999 *The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity*. London: Sage Publications
- Davies, C.A, 1998 *Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Selves and Others*. London: Routledge
- Davies, J and Spencer, D. 2010. *Emotions in the Field: The psychology and anthropology of fieldwork experience*. Stanford University Press
- Devereux, G. 1967 *From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences*. New York, Humanities Press
- Devereux, G. 1978 *Ethnopschoanalysis: Psychoanalysis and Anthropology as Complimentary Frames of Reference*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Eggan, D. 1949. The significance of dreams for anthropological research, *American Anthropologist*, **51** (2): 177-198
- Ellis, C. 2007. 'The emotional life: honoring Ronald J. Pelias', in Denzin, N.K. (Ed.), *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*, Vol. 29, Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 9-15.
- Ellis, C. 2004. *The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel About Autoethnography*. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
- Ellis, C. 1995. *Final Negotiations: A Story of Love, Loss and Chronic Illness*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA.
- Ellis, C. 1991. Emotional sociology, *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*, **12**, pp. 123-45.
- Ellis, C. and Bochner, A. (eds) 1996. *Composing Ethnography: Alternative Forms of Qualitative Writing*. AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, CA.
- Emerson, R.M. 1983. *Contemporary Field Research* (eds), Boston: Little, Brown
- Etherington, K. 2004. *Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using Ourselves in Research*. Jessica Kingsley Publishers
- Evans, J.A., Kunda, G. and Barley, S.R. 2004. Beach time, bridge time, and billable hours: the temporal structure of technical contracting, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **49** (1), p1-38
- Feldman, M.S. 2000. Organizational routines as a source of continuous change, *Org. Sci.*, **11** (6), p611-629
- Fine, G.A. 1999. Field Labor and Ethnographic Reality. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 28:532-539
- Filstead, W.J. 1970. *Qualitative Methodology*, Chicago: Markham

- Fliess, R. 1953 Countertransference and counter-identification, *J. of the American Psychoanalytic Assoc.*, **1** (2): 268-284
- Freud, S. 1953 *The Interpretation of Dreams*. London: Hogarth Press
- Garfunkel, H. 1986. *Ethnomethodological Studies at Work*. Taylor & Francis
- Gephart, Jr., R.P. 1993. The textual approach: risk and blame in disaster sensemaking. *Acad. of Management Journal*, **36** (6), p1465-1514,
- Gilbert, D. 2006. *Stumbling on Happiness*. New York: Vintage Books
- Goffman, E. 1961. *Asylums*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor.
- Gordon, R. A. and Howell, J. E. 1959 *Higher Education for Business*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Greenwood, R. and Suddaby, R. 2006. Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: the big five accounting firms, *Acad. of Management Journal*, **49** (1): 27-48
- Habenstein, R.W. (ed) 1970. *Pathways to Data*. Chicago: Aldine
- Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. 2007. *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*. London: Routledge
- Hargadon, A.B. and Bechky, B.A. 2006. When collections of creatives become creative collections: a field study of problem solving at work. *Organization Science*, **17** (4): 484-500
- Harris, J. and Huntington, A. 2001. 'Emotions as analytic tools: qualitative research, feelings, and psychotherapeutic insight', pp. 129-46 in Gilbert, K. (ed.), *The Emotional Nature of Qualitative Research*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
- Jung, C.G. 1974 (2006) *Dreams*. London: Routledge

- Kilborne, B. 1995. Dreams. *In the Encyclopedia of Religions*, 4. Mircea Eliade (ed), pp. 482-492, New York, Simon and Schuster
- Kilborne, B. 1981 Pattern, structure and style in anthropological studies of dreams, *Ethos*, **9**: 165-185
- Kimball, S.T. and Watson, J.B. 1972. *Crossing Cultural Boundaries: The Anthropological Experience*. Chandler Publication Co.
- Kisfalvi, V. 2006. Subjectivity and emotions as sources of insight in an ethnographic case study: a tale of the field, *M@nagement*, 9 (3): 109-127
- Kleinman, S. and Copp, M.A. 1994. *Emotions and Fieldwork*. London: Sage Publications
- Kondo, D. 1990. *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- LeCompte, M.D., Preissle, J. and Tesch, R. 1993 *Ethnography and Qualitative Design in Educational Research* (2nd ed). Academic Press
- Lederman, R. 1990. Pretexts for ethnography: on reading fieldnotes, in R. Sanjek (ed.) *Fieldnotes*, Cornell University Press
- Lee, R.M. 1995. *Dangerous Fieldwork*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Levine, S. 1981. Dreams of the informant about the researcher: some difficulties inherent in the research relationships, *Ethos*, **9** (4): 276-293
- Locke, K. 1996. A funny thing happened! The management of consumer emotions in service encounters, *Organ. Sci.*, **7** (1): 40-59
- Lofland, J. and Lofland, L.H. 1995. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide To Qualitative Observation And Analysis*, Wadsworth Pub Co

- Lohmann, R.I. 2000. The role of dreams in religious enculturation among the Asabano of Papua New Guinea, *Ethos* **28** (1): 75-102
- Lyons, A. and Lyons, H. 2004 *Irregular Connections: A History of Anthropology and Sexuality*. University of Nebraska Press
- Maitlis, S. 2005. The social processes of organizational sensemaking. *Academy of Management Journal*, **48** (1): 21-49
- Manilowski, B. 1967 *A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.
- Marcus, G.E. 1998 *Ethnography Through Thick & Thin*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Marcus, G.E. and Cushman, D. 1982 Ethnographies as text. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 11: 25-69
- Metiu, A. 2006. Owning the code: status closure in distributed groups, *Organization Science*, **17** (4), p418-435,
- Michel, A. A. 2007. A distributed cognition perspective on newcomers' change processes: the management of cognitive uncertainty in two investment banks, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, **52**: (4): 507-557
- Mintzberg, H. 1973. *The Nature of Managerial Work*. Joanna Cotler Books
- Okely, J. and Callaway, H. (eds) 1992 *Anthropology and Autobiography*, London: Routledge
- O'Neil, C. 1976. *Dreams, Culture and the Individual*. San Francisco: Chandler and Sharp

- Perlow, L.A. 1999. The time famine: toward a sociology of work time, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **44** (1): 57-81
- Perlow, L.A., Gittell, J.H. and Katz, N. 2004. Contextualizing patterns of work group interaction: toward a nested theory of structuration, *Organ. Sci.*, **15**: 5, p520-536
- Perlow, L.A., Okhuysen, G.A., and Repenning, N.P. 2002. The speed trap: exploring the relationship between decision making and temporal context, *Acad. of Management Journal*, **4** (5): 931-955
- Peters, R. 1998. 'A Jungian's approach to dreams'. In *Contemporary Jungian Analysis: Post-Jungian Perspectives from the Society of Analytical Psychology* (pp: 131-141) by I. Alister and C. Hauke (eds), London: Routledge
- Peters, R. 1990. *Living With Dreams*. London: Andre Deutsch
- Pratt, M.G. 2000. The good, the bad, and the ambivalent: managing identification among Amway distributors, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **45** (3): 456-493
- Prasad, P. and Prasad, A. 2000. Stretching the Iron Cage: the constitution and implications of routine workplace resistance, *Organ. Sci.*, **11** (4), p387-403
- Price, S.R.F. 1986. The future of dreams: from Freud to Artemidorus, *Past and Present*, **113**: 3-37.
- Reed-Danahay, D. 2001 'Autobiography, intimacy and ethnography' Ch 28 in Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S. Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. (eds) *Handbook of Ethnography*, London: Sage
- Reed-Danahay, D. 1997 *Auto/Ethnography: v. 37: Rewriting the Self and the Social* (ed). Berg Publishers
- Rignano, E. 1920. A new theory of sleep and dreams, *Mind*, **29** (115): 313-322

- Rorty, R. 2000, 'Being that can be understood by language', *London Review of Books*, March 16
- Rosaldo, R. 1993. *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press
- Rose, D. 1990. *Living the Ethnographic Life*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Rosen, M. 1985. Breakfast at Spiro's: dramaturgy and dominance, *J. of Management*, **11** (2), p31
- Stein, H.F. 2000. From countertransference to social theory: a study of Holocaust thinking in business dress, *Ethos*, **28** (3): 346-378
- Stewart, C. 1997. Field in dreams: anxiety, experience and the limits of social constructivism in modern Greek dream narratives, *American Ethnologist*, **24** (4): 877-894
- Stickgold, R., Hobson, J.A., Fosse, R. and Fosse, M. 2001. Sleep, learning and dreams: off-line memory reprocessing. *Science*. 294(5544): 1052-1057
- Stoeltje, B.J., Christie, L.F. and Stephen, O. 1999. The self in fieldwork: a methodological concern, *The Journal of American Folklore*, **112** (444): 158-182
- Stoller, P. 1997. *Sensual Scholarship*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
- Tedlock, B. 2003. The new anthropology of dreaming, Ch 6 (p. 103-119) in Harvey, G. (ed.) *Shamanism: A Reader*. London: Routledge
- Tedlock, B. 1994. *The evidence from dreams*. In Handbook 279-285. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press
- Van Maanen, J. 1995. *Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- Van Maanen, J. 1975 Police socialization: a longitudinal examination of job attitudes in an urban police department, *Admin. Sci. Quarterly*, **20** (2): 207-228
- Van Maanen, J. and Kolb, D. 1983. The professional apprentice: observations on fieldwork roles in two organizational settings, in S.B. Bacharach (ed.) *Research in Organizational Sociology*, Vol. 3, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press (The version consulted was published in 1982 as MIT working paper W.P. 1323-82)
- Vickers, M.H. 2007. Autoethnography as Sensemaking: A Story of Bullying, *Culture and Organization*, **13** (3): 223 – 237
- Wacquant, L.J.D. 2005. Carnal Connections: On Embodiment, Apprenticeship, and Membership, *Qualitative Sociology*, **28** (4): 445-474
- Wacquant, L.J.D. 2004. *Body & Soul: Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Wacquant, L.J.D. 1995. The pugilistic point of view: how boxers think and feel about their trade, *Theory and Society*, **24** (4): 489-535
- Wallace, D.F. 2006 'Roger Federer as religious experience', *The New York Times* (20 August)
- Walsham, G. 1993. *Interpreting Information Systems in Organizations*. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Weeks, J.R. 2004. *Unpopular Culture: The Ritual of Complaint in a British Bank*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Whitehead, T.L. and Conaway, M.E. 1986. *Self, Sex and Gender in Cross-Cultural Fieldwork*. University of Illinois Press
- Whiteman, G., Müller, T. and Johnson, J.M. 2009. Strong emotions at work,

Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management, **4** (1), 46-61

Whiteman, G. and Cooper, W. 2000. Ecological embeddedness, *Acad. of Management Journal*, **43** (6), 1265-1282.

Yarlykapov, A.A. 2007. Dreams of an Ethnographer: (An Attempt at Autoethnographic Analysis), *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia*, **46** (2): 34-41

Zilber, T.B. 2002. Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meanings, and actors: the case of a rape crisis center in Israel, *Acad. of Management Journal*, **45** (1). 234-254.