Module Details |
The information contained in this module specification was correct at the time of publication but may be subject to change, either during the session because of unforeseen circumstances, or following review of the module at the end of the session. Queries about the module should be directed to the member of staff with responsibility for the module. |
Title | MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | ||
Code | MATH331 | ||
Coordinator |
Dr DM Lewis Mathematical Sciences D.M.Lewis@liverpool.ac.uk |
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Year | CATS Level | Semester | CATS Value |
Session 2018-19 | Level 6 FHEQ | Second Semester | 15 |
Aims |
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· To explore, from a game-theoretic point of view, models which have been used to understand phenomena in which conflict and cooperation occur. · To see the relevance of the theory not only to parlour games but also to situations involving human relationships, economic bargaining (between trade union and employer, etc), threats, formation of coalitions, war, etc.. · To treat fully a number of specific games including the famous examples of "The Prisoners'' Dilemma" and "The Battle of the Sexes". · To treat in detail two-person zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. · To give a brief review of n-person games. · In microeconomics, to look at exchanges in the absence of money, i.e. bartering, in which two individuals or two groups are involved. To see how the Prisoner''s Dilemma arises in the context of public goods. |
Learning Outcomes |
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After completing the module students should: · Have further extended their appreciation of the role of mathematics in modelling in Economics and the Social Sciences. · Be able to formulate, in game-theoretic terms, situations of conflict and cooperation. · Be able to solve mathematically a variety of standard problems in the theory of games. · To understand the relevance of such solutions in real situations. |
Syllabus |
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1 |
1 Simple examples of games. Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of utility. Concepts: Conflict and cooperation; game-trees, normal and extensive form; domination, Nash equilibrium. Two-player, zero-sum games: statement of maximin theorem and its consequences; solution (2 x 2, 2 x 3, 3 x 3). Two-player, non-zero-sum, non-cooperative games: solution concepts and implication for Prisoners'' Dilemma. Two-player cooperative games: Bargaining and threat concepts. N-player cooperative games: coalitions, characteristic function, imputations and the core. Microeconomic theory. Edgeworth Box, public go ods. |
Recommended Texts |
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Reading lists are managed at readinglists.liverpool.ac.uk. Click here to access the reading lists for this module. Explanation of Reading List: |
Pre-requisites before taking this module (other modules and/or general educational/academic requirements): |
MATH101; MATH102; MATH103 MATH227 is useful but not required |
Co-requisite modules: |
Modules for which this module is a pre-requisite: |
Programme(s) (including Year of Study) to which this module is available on a required basis: |
Programme(s) (including Year of Study) to which this module is available on an optional basis: |
Programme:G100 Year:3 Programme:G101 Year:3,4 Programme:G110 Year:3 Programme:G1F7 Year:3 Programme:G1R9 Year:4 Programme:GG13 Year:3 Programme:GN11 Year:3 Programme:GG14 Year:3 Programme:GR11 Year:4 Programme:GV15 Year:3 Programme:BCG0 Year:3 Programme:L000 Year:3 Programme:Y001 Year:3 Programme:MMAS Year:1 Programme:G1N3 Year:3 Programme:NG31 Year:3 |
Assessment |
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EXAM | Duration | Timing (Semester) |
% of final mark |
Resit/resubmission opportunity |
Penalty for late submission |
Notes |
Written Exam | 2.5 hours | Second semester | 100 | Standard University Policy | Assessment 1 Notes (applying to all assessments) Marks will be awarded to the best five answers. All questions carry equal marks. | |
CONTINUOUS | Duration | Timing (Semester) |
% of final mark |
Resit/resubmission opportunity |
Penalty for late submission |
Notes |